Archive for July, 2012

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Using unlicensed trade dress is just not Koo, man.

The look of a product, all by itself, is sometimes the basis for a trademark, sometimes this is referred to as “trade dress”. Trade dress is a form of intellectual property that generally refers to characteristics of the visual appearance of a product or its packaging that signify the source of the product to consumers.

Under the Lanham Act a product’s trade dress is legally protected. For example, the shape, color, and arrangement of the materials, though not the garments themselves, of a children’s clothing line may be protectable trade dress. Similarly, the design of a magazine cover and the appearance and décor of a restaurants may be protectable.

Under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s trade dress can be protected without formal registration with the PTO. In relevant part, section 43(a) states the following:

“Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive [...] as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such an act.”[9]

Often the design of a product is protected by a patent, but sometimes, the appearance of a product or a particular feature of a product can be registered and/or enforced as a trademark.  To distinguish it from a design patent (a patent granted on the ornamental design of a functional item like ornamental designs of jewelry, furniture, beverage containers, and computer icons). Usually, you have to use the “mark” enough so that it may be inferred that consumers perceive it just as they would a brand name.  The most famous example is probably the Coca-Cola bottle, which was once protected by a design patent, but is now protected by a trademark.

The standard is the same for trade dress and “design” trademarks as all other trademarks. To get trademark protection, the trademark owner must show that the mark is not likely to be confused with other trademarks for items in the same general class. Unlike design patents, these trademarks can last indefinitely as long as they are used in commerce. Nevertheless, items can be covered by both trademarks and design patents.

Design patents are only granted if the design is novel and not obvious for all items, even those of different utility than the patented object. Unlike “design” trademarks, the validity of design patents is not affected by whether or not the design is commercialized.

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By: Mark R. Malek

For weeks now I have been going round and round with some folks on twitter about the legitimacy of copyright law. Of course, this prompted me to write some articles proving why they are wrong (see the articles here, here and here).  As you can imagine, that did not stop the discussion.  Why would a voice of reason, or any rational thought at all stand in the way of their ridiculous musings.

I think I got to the bottom of some of what they are preaching.  It took me a while, but it is funny how their entire argument revolves around a lack of understanding of copyright law.  The argument that was getting irresponsibly made was that once they had obtained a copy, it was their “right” to do whatever they want with it.

This is somewhat backpedaling from the original argument of “I have a RIGHT to copy.”  That argument was simply intolerable, which is why I remained engaged with them.  Another part is that we are both clearly bullheaded about this topic, and I am just not going to let them have the last word – especially not when that word is egregiously wrong!  There clearly is not “right” to copy.  Ok, that is a broad statement.  There can be a right to copy, but you have to pay for that right.  There is no “natural right” to copy (yes, that is another one of their ridiculous arguments).

Let’s assume that the copyright abolitionist has obtained a copy of a work of art by lawful means.  For this group, that is a stretch, but that is the only way that I am able to explain the first sale doctrine of copyright law.  So now that they have obtained a copy of the work of art by lawful means, i.e., paid for the song and downloaded it off of iTunes, or went to Barnes & Noble and purchased a book, etc., I would actually agree that they have the right to use that copy… and only that copy!  Can they resell that copy?  Absolutely!  That is why I am able to purchase used books at garage sales.

The line is blurred in the digital age though.  These nincompoops (yeah – I’m bringing that one back) think it is ok to retain a digital copy of the work on their hard drive and distribute as many copies of the work as they want.  That is simply not the case.  Let’s consider this – how much do you think it truly costs a group like the Dave Matthews Band to create an entire album?  It is not as though five guys sat around a campfire one night, hammered out a few songs and recorded them.  There are months and months of writing and experimenting with different types of rhythms and lyrics, followed by months in a studio trying to get just the right version of the song recorded.  That studio time costs money, the instruments cost money, the band has to eat and live somewhere during the production, then the songs have to get distributed to radio stations and the band has to make appearances in order to promote the songs, and on and on and on.  I’d be surprised if it took less than $2 or $3 million to accomplish the feat of bringing a hit album to the market.  And yet, somehow, you are able to purchase this compilation of songs on a CD (or download it from iTunes) for $12.

That is the beauty of copyright law.  Copyrights allow artists like the Dave Matthews Band to readily create hit albums, but control how the music is distributed so that they can recoup the costs and make profits on the song.  If I buy a CD and I am tired of listening to it (highly unlikely) then, pursuant to the first sale doctrine, I am free to sell it or give it away to someone, but I cannot retain a copy of that music on my computer.  The dawn of digital files is where the problem lies.  Now, to help the copyright abolitionist make his argument, I would agree that if you paid the Dave Matthews Band $3million for the CD, then you have bought all the rights to the album and all the songs, and it is your right to do with it what you want.  Copyright law, however, appreciates that people who do not have $3million (me for example) may still like to hear the wonderful tunes of the Dave Matthews Band and this is the way to make it affordable for me to hear their music.

To summarize, the first sale doctrine is the answer to the copyright abolitionist’s theory.  That is what provides them the right to do what they want to with a copy that they have rightfully obtained.  The problem they have with it is that they want to retain copies and distribute even more.  The hole in their theory is that they cannot understand that they have only lawfully obtained one copy.  That does not give you the right to turn your one copy into hundreds of copies.

 

 

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By Daniel Davidson

The goodwill of a company is its most valuable asset, and when you think of goodwill you think of trademarks.  Well, maybe not, but McCarthy, the guru of trademarks, would.  In a recent letter authored by a senior trademark counsel for Jack Daniel’s, the strength and goodwill of the Jack Daniel’s marks were exactly what she was attempting to preserve.

Dubbed the “Nicest Legal Letter Ever,” the cease and desist letter sent to Patrick Wensink ever so nicely asked Mr. Wensink to remove the alleged infringing cover of his newly released book, Broken Piano for President.  The cover is very old no. 7ish.

It seems as though both parties are going to benefit from this overly kind assertion of trademark rights.  The new author is getting quite the free PR from this letter going viral and Jack Daniel’s is being held ahigh for their gracious tactics.  Trademark attorneys could even take a note on how to go about trademark policing.  Albeit, the letter does make for a good read, and an unrealistic example of what you would receive if you were trademark infringing perp.

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Don’t we all?

In a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Google General Counsel Kent Walker  has argued that proprietary non-standardized technologies that become ubiquitous due to their popularity with consumers should be considered de facto standards:

While collaborative [Standards Setting Organizations (SSOs)] play an important part in the overall standard setting system, and are particularly prominent in industries such as telecommunications, they are not the only source of standards. Indeed, many of the same interoperability benefits that the FTC and others have touted in the SSO context also occur when one firm publishes information about an otherwise proprietary standard and other firms then independently decide (whether by choice or of necessity) to make complementary investments to support that standard in their products. … Because proprietary or de facto standards can have just as important effects on consumer welfare, the Committee’s concern regarding the abuse of SEPs should encompass them as well.

Is that all the time, or only when it suits Google’s interests? Popularity and ubiquity are not (yet) enough to limit the scope of patent protection.

Google is forwarding the argument that some inventions are so good that they should be considered “standards” subject to restrictions. In a letter of his own, Apple General Counsel Bruce Sewell responded. “That a proprietary technology becomes quite popular does not transform it into a ‘standard’ subject to the same legal constraints as true standards.”

Sewell wrote:

The capabilities of an iPhone are categorically different from a conventional phone, and result from Apple’s ability to bring its traditional innovation in computing to the mobile market. Using an iPhone to take photos, manage a home-finance spreadsheet, play video games, or run countless other applications has nothing to do with standardized protocols. Apple spent billions in research and development to create the iPhone, and third party software developers have spent billions more to develop applications that run on it. The price of an iPhone reflects the value of these nonstandardized technologies — as well as the value of the aesthetic design of the iPhone, which also reflects immense study and development by Apple, and which is entirely unrelated to standards.

The distinction may be in the origin of the popularity. Was it from being adopted industry-wide, or was it because one developer invented a really good technology, forcing everyone else to get on board or fall behind. Here, Apple took a cell phone, made an iPhone, and now we have the patent wars.

Apple’s argument mirrors the rationale for our patent system itself: an inventor gets property rights to an idea for a limited time, in exchange for disclosing the idea. Others can embrace and extend the invention, but only when the patent expires.

Cook argues:

No one should be able to get an injunction off a standards-essential patent because the owner of the patent has the responsibility to license it on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory manner . . . [a]nd so when somebody comes to you and tries to get some obscene level of money from you for this, they are in essence telling you they are not going to license it because they want to go try to get an injunction and use the court system to do that. In my view, they use it in a way that it wasn’t intended. … And you can always argue about the payment, and there has to be a forum for resolving those disputes. The problem in this industry is if you add up what everybody says the standards-essential patents are worth, no one else could be in the phone business. Competition would be locked out. And so it’s kind of gotten crazy — this is one issue. There is some of this that is maddening. It’s a waste; it’s a time-suck. However, does it stop innovation? It’s not going to stop us from innovating — no — but it’s overhead. It’s overhead that I wish didn’t exist.

For more, read here.

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By: Mark R. Malek

A couple of weeks ago, I wrote an article about overenforcement of copyrights.  In that particular article, I gave the example of a software copyright case (at least it was filed in Federal Court as a software copyright case) where the attorney was trying to argue everything but copyright.  Of course, he lost.

In that case, the attorney continuously argued that since my client’s software performed the same function, it must have infringed the copyright on his client’s software.  He could not have been further from correct, as was evident in the summary judgment that was awarded in favor of my client.  In short, copyright does not protect function.  Copyright, by definition, provides the author of an original work various rights to exploit that work and to prevent others from exploiting the original work without authorization for a fixed period of time (yes, I will write about the “fixed” period of time and how it magically extends every so often). I expect to receive several comments from the copyright abolitionists that I have been arguing with lately.  To see my previous articles on trying to figure out the arguments of the copyright abolitionists, click here and here.  Don’t worry, I’ll get back to proving why the copyright abolitionists cannot articulate an argument that makes any sense whatsoever soon.

Back to the issue at hand – why did this attorney so blur the lines between patents and copyrights? Short answer – there was likely a competence issue.  Another possibility, however, is that both copyright and patents can be used to protect software.  Copyrights, however, only protect the authorship and artistic expression that is the result of software, whereas patents protect the function that the software carries out.  For example, the actual lines of code used to write the software are copyrightable, and the expression of the software on the screen, e.g., a website design and layout, is also copyrightable.

The function that the software carries out, however, is not copyrightable.  Instead, that is protectable by patents.  Although this is a simplistic example, software that provides a function of linking several users together so that they can purchase and sell items in an on-line setting (eBay) may be patentable.  In other words, an application directed to patentable subject matter could be written that protects the function of an on-line auction system.  The issue there, however, is that something so broad would never in a million years be allowed.  There is so much software out there, and so many people that are developing software that the amount of prior art is tremendous.  That is why folks who are embarking on the software patent process need to understand that such patent applications are extraordinarily expensive and, if allowable, will only cover limited scope.  Gone are the days of preposterously broad software patents.  I believe that is one of the advantages of software patents – it is not as though a patent will be allowed for something as broad as an on-line auction site.  Instead, a patent that could possibly be allowed on software would need to include several details and be narrowly tailored to the specific unique and non-obvious function that the software carries out.

Therefore, to unblur the lines between copyrights and patents, just remember one simple rule.  Under no circumstance is function protectable using copyright.

 


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