Software Patents – A Question That Will Never Be Answered

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In a recent post on PatentlyO.com, patent law guru Dennis Crouch detailed two recent decisions from the CAFC, Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada and CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.  Each case involved a patent having its validity challenged under 35 U.S.C. 101 as being directed to unpatentable subject matter, namely software.  Mr. Crouch excerpted a portion of Bancorp, reposted below, which helps illuminate the trend of thinking apparently being adopted by our venerable interpreters of the Patent Law:

In CLS, we reversed the district court and held that method, system, and medium claims directed to a specific application of exchanging obligations between parties using a computer were patent eligible under § 101. In faulting the district court for “ignoring claim limitations in order to abstract a process down to a fundamental truth,” we explained that the asserted claims in CLS were patent eligible because “it [wa]s difficult to conclude that the computer limitations … d[id] not play a significant part in the performance of the invention or that the claims [we]re not limited to a very specific application of the [inventive] concept.” Here, in contrast, the district court evaluated the limitations of the claims as a whole before concluding that they were invalid under § 101. As we explained above, the computer limitations do not play a “significant part” in the performance of the claimed invention. And unlike in CLS, the claims here are not directed to a “very specific application” of the inventive concept; as noted, Bancorp seeks to broadly claim the unpatentable abstract concept of managing a stable value protected life insurance policy.

 Judging from the above, the determination as to whether a claim is directed to patentable subject matter turns on whether it might be difficult to conclude the computer limitation plays a significant part in the performance of the invention.  A nebulous standard to be sure.  If only it were the case that a second qualifying determination provided more concrete guidance, but we are left with that the claim must be “a very specific application” of an inventive concept.
In my own experience, 101 rejections related to software require recitation of a computer with at least one of two types of qualification: specific function or specific form.  Examples have included computers configured to include a user interface that can be manipulated by a user, mobile telephones (having both form and function requirements), and computerized devices configured to communicate across a network.  Examiners appear to have been emboldened by promulgated USPTO guidance, based upon recent case law, to issue more and more 101 rejections on grounds similar to the issues presented in the cases above. Moreover, given the impossibility of getting clarification from the bench, those in the trenches are dealing with the fallout of seemingly arbitrary and capricious decisions making distinctions that are difficult to extrapolate beyond the specific facts of that case.  Perhaps the CAFC is falling prey to its own line of thought; its decisions appear to not be playing a significant part in answering the big questions of the day.

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